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I. INTRODUCTION
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lighting is cruel
and unusual .... [T]he petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom
the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.2
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court held, in Furman v.
Georgia,3 that Georgia's death penalty statute violated the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment
because it gave judges and jurors "untrammeled discretion"4 to
2. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4. Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Capital Sentencing Regime
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decide which defendants should be sentenced to death. The pre-
Furman era of capital sentencing in America was characterized
by a standardless sentencing regime resulting in death sentences
that were "wantonly and ... freakishly imposed"5 in that there
was no "rational basis that could differentiate ... the few who die
from the many who go to prison."6 For the "capriciously selected
random handful"7 chosen to die, it was akin to being "struck by
lightning."8 Justice Stewart further observed that, "if any basis
can be discerned for the selection of these few . .. , it is the
constitutionally impermissible basis of race."9 The decision in
Furman effectively created a moratorium on the death penalty
for those states (including South Carolina) that had death
penalty statutes similar to Georgia's. Several states attempted
to draft new death penalty statutes in accordance with the
constitutional principles articulated in Furman.
In 1976, the Supreme Court approved of Georgia's revamped
death penalty statute in Gregg v. Georgia.1O The Court pointed to
three features of Georgia's new statute that were critical to its
acceptance: (1) it narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the
death penalty by providing ten aggravating circumstances, "one
of which must be found by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable
doubt before a death sentence can ever be imposed";11 (2) it
required the jury to consider the particular circumstances of the
crime and the defendant before it was permitted to make its
sentencing recommendation;12 and (3) it included the "important
additional safeguard"13 of requiring the state supreme court to
determine whether a sentence had been "imposed under the
5. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 309.
9. Id. at 310.
10. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
11. Id. at 196-97.
12. Id. at 197; see also id. ("No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's
jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or
direction, decide whether he should live or die.").
13. Id. at 198.
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
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influence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports
the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those
sentences imposed in similar cases."14
In response to Gregg, South Carolina passed its own death
penalty statute essentially identical to the one that the Supreme
Court approved of in Gregg.15 However, through legislative
expansion of the statute and judicial interpretation over the
years, South Carolina has failed to adhere to the constitutional
standards set forth in Furman and Gregg, thus reverting to a
pre-Furman death penalty scheme. South Carolina's current
death penalty statute makes virtually every murderer eligible for
the death penalty. The statute's failure to limit the death
penalty to only the most extreme and egregious cases returns
the decision to the hands of solicitors, judges, and jurors and
renders South Carolina's system susceptible to impermissible
inequities among defendants and abuses of discretion by state
officials. Compelling empirical evidence shows significant racial
effects in capital sentencing decisions in South Carolina.
Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court has failed to
correct these flaws through meaningful proportionality review.
Consequently, the death penalty in South Carolina is currently
imposed in an unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious
manner. 16
14. Id.
15. See State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799, 802 (S.C. 1979) (describing South
Carolina's 1977 death penalty statute as "patterned after the death penalty
statutes of our sister state Georgia"). South Carolina, like several other states,
had previously responded to Furman by adopting a mandatory death penalty
for certain classes of offenders. These statutes were quickly struck down,
however, as constitutionally defective for a variety of reasons. See, e.g.,
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); State v. Rumsey, 226 S.E.2d
894, 895 (S.C. 1976). For a more detailed history of the death penalty in South
Carolina, see John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the
Cornell Death Penalty Project on the Modern "Era" of Capital Punishment in
South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 285 (2002).
16. We note that we are not the first to observe the general regression
toward a pre-Furman era. Others have pointed out this trend in some of South
Carolina's sister states. See, e.g., Bill Rankin et al., A Matter of Life or Death:
Capital Sentencing Regime
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Part II of this Article provides a historical overview of the
judicial and legislative expansion of South Carolina's death
penalty statute. Part III discusses empirical data demonstrating
the statute's failure to narrow the class of offenders eligible for
the death penalty. Part IV examines and provides empirical data
on how this failure to narrow creates an opportunity for race to
continue to play an impermissible role in the life-or-death
decision, as it has historically. Part V explains how the South
Carolina Supreme Court has failed to fulfill its constitutional
duty to provide meaningful proportionality review. Finally, Part
VI uses a case example to demonstrate that there is no rational
basis distinguishing the few who die from the many who do not.
Thus, this Article concludes that South Carolina's current death
penalty scheme is unconstitutional.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: THE LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S CAPITAL
SENTENCING STATUTE
A. Relevant Legal Background
Prior to 1972, states were free to make capital punishment
available as a sentencing option for any murder or other "capital"
offense and to leave the determination of whether to actually
impose a death sentence entirely to the discretion of jurors in
individual cases.17 Although juries exercising this unbridled
Death Still Arbitrary, ATLANTA J. CONST., Sept. 23, 2007, at Al (reporting that
56% of all murders in a decade studied in Georgia were eligible for death,
including hundreds of moderately aggravated cases); John Seigenthaler, Deeper
Look Shows Even More Cases of Unequal Justice, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 10, 2010
(reporting on the striking differences in sentences that state judges and juries
gave women convicted of killing their abusive husbands in Tennessee); see also
Kristen Nugent, Proportionality and Prosecutorial Discretion: Challenges to the
Constitutionality of Georgia's Death Penalty Laws and Procedures Amidst the
Deficiencies of the State's Mandatory Appellate Review Structure, 64 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 175 (2009) (arguing that Georgia's capital sentencing scheme is
unconstitutional for many of the same reasons discussed herein-particularly,
the Georgia Supreme Court's failure to conduct a meaningful proportionality
review).
17. See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
484
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discretion were thus free to impose death sentences in large
numbers of cases, they actually imposed it in only a small
fraction of the cases in which they could have done so. 18 Over
time, the infrequency and randomness with which juries were
imposing the death penalty raised concerns that it was being
administered arbitrarily and that jurors' determinations of
whether a defendant would live or die were turning on
discriminatory factors such as race, religion, and economic or
social standing.
These concerns over arbitrariness and discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty culminated in Furman v.
Georgia, where the Supreme Court held that sentences imposed
under the standardless, entirely discretionary statutes then in
use across the country "constitute[d] cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."19 Although Furman resulted in separate opinions
from all nine Justices, the risk of arbitrariness and
discrimination inherent in a system with no mechanism for
objectively separating those who should suffer death from those
who should not was a central consideration for each of the
Justices who voted to strike down the existing statutes. 20 As the
18. Id. at 203-04.
19. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
20. See id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Yet we know that the
discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the
penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is
poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect
or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a
more protected position."); id. at 256-57 ("Thus, these discretionary statutes are
unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection
of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."); id.
at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("When the rate of infliction is at this low level,
it is highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who
commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment. No one has yet
suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who
die from the many who go to prison."); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)
("These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes
and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the
20101 Capital Sentencing Regime
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Court later observed,
[blecause of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held
that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner .... [Tihe concerns expressed
in Furman ... can be met by a carefully drafted statute that
ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate
information and guidance.21
Some states, including South Carolina, responded to
Furman's concerns over sentencer discretion by simply
eliminating that discretion altogether in favor of mandatory
death sentences for certain classes of offenders. These statutes,
however, were quickly rejected as incompatible with
"contemporary standards" and as inadequate "to provide a
constitutionally tolerable response to Furman's rejection of
unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences."22
Other states addressed the problems identified in Furman by
crafting new capital punishment procedures designed to limit
and guide the discretion of decision makers in capital cases. The
first such procedure to be reviewed and endorsed by the Supreme
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the
sentence of death has in fact been imposed .... [11f any basis can be discerned
for the selection of these few .... it is the constitutionally impermissible basis
of race .... I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.")
(footnotes omitted); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he death penalty is
exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ... there
is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not."); id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring)
("Racial or other discriminations should not be surprising. In McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S., at 207, this Court held 'that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is [not] offensive to anything in the Constitution.' This was an
open invitation to discrimination.") (alteration in original).
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1979) (opinion of Stewart, Powel
& Stevens, JJ.).
22. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301-02 (1976); see also State
v. Rumsey, 226 S.E.2d 894, 895 (S.C. 1976) (striking down South Carolina's
mandatory death penalty statute as "constitutionally defective" in light of
Woodson).
486
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Court was Georgia's in Gregg v. Georgia.23 The Georgia statutory
scheme included three features that proved critical to its
acceptance in Gregg. First, it worked "to narrow the class of
murderers subject to capital punishment by specifying 10
statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which must be found
by the jury to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a death
sentence can ever be imposed."24 Second, it required
particularized consideration of "the circumstances of the crime
and the criminal" before the jury was permitted to make its
sentencing recommendation.25 And third, the Georgia scheme
included the "important additional safeguard"26 of an "automatic
appeal,"27 under which the state supreme court was required to
determine whether a sentence had been "imposed under the
influence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports
the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and
whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those
sentences imposed in similar cases."28 "On their face," the Court
observed, "these procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of
Furman."29
After Gregg, the Supreme Court continued to refine and add
meaning to the principles upon which it had relied in upholding
Georgia's sentencing scheme. Among the most prominent of
those principles has been the requirement that a state's capital
sentencing statute "define the crimes for which death may be the
sentence in a way that obviates 'standardless [sentencing]
discretion."'30 In Godfrey v. Georgia, enforcement of this
principle required reversal of a Georgia death sentence based
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24. Id. at 196-97.
25. Id. at 197; see also id. ("No longer can a Georgia jury do as Furman's
jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or
direction, decide whether he should live or die.").
26. Id. at 198.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 196 n.47) (alteration in original).
Capital Sentencing Regime
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solely on the statutory aggravating circumstance that the offense
had been "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman."31 The Court reasoned that the language of the
aggravating circumstance was so broad and vague that "[a]
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost
every murder as" falling within it, and therefore qualifies the
defendant for a death sentence. 32 The Court went on to conclude
that reversal of the defendant's death sentence was required
because "[tihere is no principled way to distinguish this case, in
which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in
which it was not."33
In Zant v. Stephens,34 the Court considered a claim that
Georgia's capital sentencing scheme was inconsistent with
Furman because, under Georgia law, "the finding of an
aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the
sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its
function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder
who are eligible for the death penalty."35 After emphasizing once
again that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder,"36 the
Court held that Georgia's decision to have its aggravating
circumstances perform only that function was acceptable:
Our cases indicate . . . that statutory aggravating
circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the
stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution
does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating
factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those
defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. What is
important at the selection stage is an individualized
31. Id. at 426.
32. Id. at 428-29.
33. Id. at 433.
34. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
35. Id. at 874.
36. Id. at 877.
[Volume 4
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determination on the basis of the character of the individual
and the circumstances of the crime.
The Georgia scheme provides for categorical narrowing at
the definition stage, and for individualized determination and
appellate review at the selection stage.37
Over the nearly three decades since Godfrey and Zant, the
Supreme Court has consistently adhered to and reinforced the
constitutional requirement that statutory aggravating
circumstances meaningfully narrow the class of murder
defendants eligible for a death sentence.38 Consistent with this
37. Id. at 878-79 (footnote and citations omitted); see also id. at 879
(noting that the two aggravating circumstances found by Stephens' jury
"adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and
substantively rational way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the
death penalty may not be imposed.").
38. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) ("[A] state
capital sentencing system must: (1) rationally narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned, individualized
sentencing determination based on a death-eligible defendant's record, personal
characteristics, and the circumstances of his crime."); Buchanan v. Angelone,
522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998) ("In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty, often through consideration of
aggravating circumstances."); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994)
("As we have explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two
requirements. First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant
convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted
of murder."); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993) ("If the sentencer fairly
could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant
eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.");
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) ("The use of 'aggravating
circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the
class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion.");
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) ("If a State has determined that
death should be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer
that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals
for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not."). The
Supreme Court of the United States has further limited the scope of the death
penalty in recent decisions holding that persons with mental retardation and
persons under the age of eighteen can not be sentenced to death. See Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (under eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (mental retardation). In doing so, the Court noted that the
categorical exclusions were necessary in order to ensure "that only the most
deserving of execution are put to death." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
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unbroken line of precedent, the Court last Term once again
reiterated the Eighth Amendment command "that resort to the
[death] penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes and
limited in its instances of application."39
B. South Carolina's Capital Sentencing Statute, as Written by
the Legislature and Construed by the South Carolina Supreme
Court, Does Not Perform the Constitutionally Mandated
Narrowing Function
A state's capital sentencing scheme is constitutional only if
its statutory aggravating factors genuinely and objectively
narrow the class of murder offenders eligible for a sentence of
death. South Carolina's scheme was constitutional at the time of
its adoption in 1977 and likely remained so for some time
thereafter. More recently, however, dramatic legislative
expansion of the list of aggravating factors that make a murder
death-eligible and sweepingly broad judicial constructions of
several of those factors have combined to yield a set of death-
eligibility criteria that can be met in nearly all murder cases.
The result is that South Carolina's scheme for determining death
eligibility today bears a much closer resemblance to the
standardless regime outlawed in Furman than to the guided
discretion approach accepted in Gregg.
39. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2665 (2008). Even
strong supporters of capital punishment recognize the importance of applying it
narrowly through eligibility criteria designed to objectively identify only the
most deserving cases. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The
Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995) ("Increasing
the number of crimes punishable by death, widening the circumstances under
which death may be imposed, obtaining more guilty verdicts, and expanding the
population of death rows will not do a single thing to accomplish the objective,
namely to ensure that the very worst members of our society-those who, by
their heinous and depraved conduct have relinquished all claim to human
compassion-are put to death.") (footnote omitted); id. at 31 (criticizing "the
current system, where we load our death rows with many more than we can
possibly execute, and then pick those who will actually die essentially at
random").
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
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1. Legislative Adoption and Expansion of South Carolina's
Capital Sentencing Scheme
After South Carolina's post-Furman mandatory death
penalty statute was struck down in the wake of Woodson v. North
Carolina,40 the legislature responded in 1977 with a new
statutory scheme "patterned after the death penalty statutes of
our sister state Georgia."41 Like Georgia's system, South
Carolina's capital sentencing mechanism purports to perform the
constitutionally mandated narrowing function by conditioning a
murder defendant's eligibility for a death sentence on the finding
of at least one statutory aggravating factor.42
The original statute contained seven statutory aggravating
factors.43 The first of these aggravating factors included a list of
subparts making a murder death-eligible if it occurred during the
commission of any one of eight different offenses: rape, assault
with intent to ravish, kidnapping, burglary, robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon, larceny with use of a deadly weapon,
housebreaking, and killing by poison. The remaining six
statutory aggravating factors were: the murder was committed
by a person with a prior conviction for murder; the offender
"knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
40. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
41. State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799, 802 (S.C. 1979). Both the Georgia and
South Carolina statutes were modeled after the Model Penal Code,
recommended by the American Law Institute in 1962. On April 15, 2009,
however, the American Law Institute withdrew its support for its own statute,
citing a variety of reasons including: "the difficulty of limiting the list of
aggravating factors so that they do not cover (as they do in a number of state
statutes now) a large percentage of murderers," and "the near impossibility of
addressing by legal rule the conscious or unconscious racial bias within the
criminal-justice system that has resulted in statistical disparity in death
sentences based on the race of the victim." Report of the Council to the
Membership of The American Law Institute on the Matter of the Death
Penalty, Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital%20Punishme
ntweb.pdf.
42. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d at 802.
43. Act of June 8, 1977, No. 177, sec. 1, § 16-52(C)(a), 1977 S.C. Acts 407,
408.
20101 Capital Sentencing Regime
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in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would
normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person"; the
murder was committed for the purpose of receiving money or a
thing of monetary value; the murder of a judicial officer, solicitor,
or other officer of the court (current or former) during or because
of the conduct of his or her official duties; the offender either
committed or caused to be committed murder-for-hire; and the
murder of a peace officer, corrections officer, or firefighter while
engaged in the performance of his or her official duties.44
In the three decades since the original death penalty statute
was passed, the legislature has expanded the list of aggravating
factors on numerous occasions:45
e In 1978, physical torture was added to the list of
concomitant crimes that made a murder death-eligible.46
* In 1986, the legislature added two more
aggravating factors: "[m]urder wherein two or more
persons are murdered by the defendant by one act or
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct,"47 and
murder of a child eleven years old or younger. 48
* In 1990, the list was again expanded to include
murder during the commission of drug trafficking49 and
murder of a family member of a judicial officer, a peace
44. Sec. 1, §§ 16-52(C)(a)(2)-(7), 1977 S.C. Acts 407, 408.
45. This steady expansion is precisely the opposite of what the Supreme
Court envisioned when it upheld Georgia's statutory response to Furman in
Gregg. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 n.15 (1983) (recalling Justice
White's concurring opinion in Gregg, which "asserted that, over time, as the
aggravating circumstance requirement was applied, 'the types of murders for
which the death penalty may be imposed [would] become more narrowly defined
and [would be] limited to those which are particularly serious or for which the
death penalty is peculiarly appropriate."' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 222 (1976) (White, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
46. Act of June 30, 1978, No. 555, sec. 1, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1), 1978 S.C. Acts
1636, 1636.
47. Omnibus Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986, sec. 27, § 16-3-
20(C)(a)(8)-(9), 1986 S.C. Acts 2955, 2985.
48. Id.
49. Act of June 25, 1990, No. 604, sec. 15, § 16-3-20(C)(a), 1990 S.C. Acts
2549, 2567-68.
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officer, a corrections officer, or a firefighter with "intent
to impede or retaliate against the official."50
* In 1995, dismemberment of a person was added as
an aggravating factor.51
* In 1996, the legislature added an entirely new
aggravating factor: "[t]he murder of a witness or
potential witness committed at any time during the
criminal process for the purpose of impeding or deterring
prosecution of any crime."52
0 In 2002, the factor covering peace and correction
officers was expanded to include "[tihe murder of a
federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or former
federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, peace
officer or former peace officer, corrections officer or
former corrections officer, including a county or
municipal corrections officer or a former county or
municipal corrections officer, a county or municipal
detention facility employee or former county or municipal
detention facility employee, or fireman or former fireman
during or because of the performance of his official
duties."53
e In 2006, as part of the "Sex Offender Accountability
and Protection of Minors Act of 2006," the legislature
expanded the list again to make sexually violent
predators death-eligible.54
* And in 2007, the legislature acted again, adding
arson in the first degree to the list of concomitant crimes
50. Id.
51. Act of June 7, 1995, No. 83, sec. 10, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(i), 1995 S.C. Acts
545, 558.
52. Act of May 20, 1996, No. 317, sec. 1, § 16-3-20(C)(a), 1996 S.C. Acts
2028, 2028.
53. Act of May 1, 2002, No. 224, sec. 1, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(7), 2002 S.C. Acts
2537, 2537-38.
54. Sex Offender Accountability and Protection of Minors Act of 2006, sec.
2, § 16-3-20(C)(a), 2006 S.C. Acts 2697, 2699.
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that make a murder death-eligible.55
Thus, as it currently stands, the South Carolina death
penalty statute enumerates twelve statutory aggravating
factors,56 the first of which includes ten individual subparts for a
total of twenty-one circumstances that can make a murder death-
eligible.57 On its face, such a broad array of death-eligible
circumstances would have difficulty passing muster under Gregg
and its progeny. In practice, however, the situation is even worse
than the statute suggests, as South Carolina's gradual but steady
drift toward a pre-Furman death penalty scheme has been
substantially exacerbated by the state judiciary's broad
constructions of several of the statute's aggravating factors.
2. Judicial Expansion of Death-Eligibility in South Carolina
As is true with regard to virtually any statutory provision,
the scope of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20's aggravating factors is
subject to judicial interpretation.58 The more narrowly a state's
statutory aggravating factors are construed, the more likely its
scheme as a whole is to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. Conversely, the more broadly aggravating factors
establishing death-eligibility are construed, the greater the
likelihood that the state's capital sentencing scheme will violate
the requirements established in Gregg.59
In South Carolina, the legislature's steady expansion of the
55. Act of June 18, 2007, No. 101, sec. 1, § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1), 2007 S.C. Acts
488, 488.
56. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)-(12) (1976 & Supp. 2009).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(a)-(j) (2009).
58. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 453 (2005) (noting that Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), rejected a challenge to a statutory aggravating
factor "on the express ground that a narrowing construction had been adopted
by that State's Supreme Court"); In re Amir X.S., 639 S.E.2d 144, 146 (S.C.
2006) (recognizing judicial authority to impose "limiting construction" on a
statute).
59. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 876-77 (1983); see also id. at 877
("To avoid this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to
others found guilty of murder.") (footnote omitted).
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class of death-eligible murders, as described previously, has been
matched-if not surpassed-by the South Carolina Supreme
Court's sweeping construction of several statutory aggravating
factors. Four examples are described below.
a. Physical Torture
Pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(c)(1)(h) (1976), a
murder is death-eligible if it occurs during the commission of
"physical torture." The statute does not define the conduct or
circumstances which constitute "physical torture." In 1983, the
South Carolina Supreme Court adopted Georgia's definition of
that term, holding in State v. Elmore that '[tiorture occurs when
the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death,"'60
or 'when the victim is subjected to an aggravated battery."'61
Since Elmore, the South Carolina Supreme Court has carried
out a significant expansion of what was already a very inclusive
definition of physical torture. For example, in State v. Davis,62
the court endorsed the following description of "aggravated
battery" constituting physical torture:
What is aggravated battery? An aggravated battery is an
unlawful act of violent injury to the person of another,
accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, such as the use
of a dangerous, or deadly, object; the infliction of serious bodily
injury with intent to commit a felony; a great disparity
between the ages and physical condition of the parties; a
difference in the sexes. 63
On its face, this definition encompasses-and therefore
renders death-eligible-the vast majority of murders committed
with weapons and all murders involving defendants and victims
of opposite sexes. If taken literally, this definition encompasses
60. State v. Elmore, 308 S.E.2d 781, 785 (S.C. 1983) (quoting Hance v.
State, 268 S.E.2d 339, 345 (Ga. 1980)).
61. Id. (quoting Hance, 268 S.E.2d at 345).
62. 422 S.E.2d 133 (S.C. 1992).
63. Id. at 147.
2010]
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 495 2009-2010
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW
all murders because any object used to murder someone is
inherently "a dangerous or deadly object."
Additionally, in State v. Johnson,64 the court further
expanded the circumstances in which physical torture can be
found, this time to include cases in which the victim had no
conscious awareness of pain. According to the court, "[p]hysical
torture is not predicated upon the amount of pain suffered by a
murder victim. Although conscious awareness of pain may
buttress the conclusion that the victim was subjected to serious
physical abuse before death, its absence does not foreclose a
finding of physical torture."65
b. Kidnapping
Under South Carolina law, murder is death-eligible if it
occurs during the commission of a kidnapping.66 As with
"physical torture," the statute is silent with respect to the
definition of kidnapping. The South Carolina Supreme Court
filled this definitional void by reference to South Carolina's
kidnapping statute, which provides that "[w]hoever shall
unlawfully seize, confine, inveigle, decoy, kidnap, abduct or carry
away any other person by any means whatsoever without
authority of law"67 is guilty of kidnapping.68
In State v. Tucker,69 the court expanded the definition of
kidnapping when it accompanies a murder. In Tucker, the
defendant challenged the trial court's finding of kidnapping70
based on evidence that he duct-taped the victim to a bed while he
searched for things to steal, then shot and killed the victim while
he packed to leave.71 Relying on a non-murder case, the South
Carolina Supreme Court explained that, "[k]idnapping is a
64. 525 S.E.2d 519 (S.C. 2000).
65. Id. at 526.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(1)(b) (1976).
67. See § 16-3-910.
68. See, e.g., State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 1982).
69. 512 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1999).
70. Id. at 105.
71. Id. at 102.
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continuing offense. The offense commences when one is
wrongfully deprived of freedom and continues until freedom is
restored."72 Applying this view to the facts in Tucker, the court
concluded that "[the victim] was unquestionably deprived of her
freedom once appellant bound her with the duct tape," and added
that "restraint constitutes kidnapping within the meaning [of the
statute], regardless of the fact that the purpose of this seizure
was to facilitate the commission of a [crime other than
murder] ."73
In State v. Stokes,74 the court utilized the kidnapping
statute's references to inveigling and decoying to further expand
the range of conduct satisfying § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(b). Relying on
the New Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus, the court defined
"decoy" as 'to lure successfully"'75 and defined "inveigling" as
'enticing, cajoling, or tempting the victim, usually through some
deceitful means such as false promises."'76 Based on these
definitions, the court concluded that the defendant kidnapped the
victim by luring her into the woods for the ostensible purpose of
facilitating her willing participation in the killing of a third
party.77
This expansive definition of kidnapping created by the South
Carolina Supreme Court has substantially broadened the range
of conduct capable of elevating a murder to death-eligibility.78
72. Id. at 105 (citing State v. Hall, 310 S.E.2d 429 (S.C. 1983)).
73. Id.
74. 548 S.E.2d 202, 205 (S.C. 2001).
75. Id. at 204 n.6 (quoting NEW WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 250
(1993)).
76. Id. at 204 n.6 (quoting United States v. Macklin, 671 F.2d 60, 66 (2d
Cir. 1982)).
77. Id. at 204.
78. See, e.g., State v. Vazsquez, 613 S.E.2d 359, 361 (S.C. 2005) (finding
murder during the commission of kidnapping where defendant locked two
people in restaurant freezer, from which they escaped five minutes later and
fled the scene unharmed); State v. Kelly, 540 S.E.2d 851, 853 (S.C. 2001)
(finding murder during the commission of kidnapping where defendant duct-
taped victim's hands behind her back); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 304
(S.C. 2001) (finding kidnapping where defendant forced victims to walk from
the back of a barbershop to the front, then back again, during holdup).
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c. Attempted Armed Robbery
South Carolina also provides for death-eligibility where a
murder takes place while in the commission of an armed
robbery.79 In State v. Humphries,80 the South Carolina Supreme
Court construed the statutory phrase "while in the commission
of' to encompass any "acts that are concurrent with the
murder."81 Consequently, both uncompleted attempts to commit
accompanying crimes and accompanying crimes completed only
after the murder are sufficient to elevate a murder to a death-
eligible offense under § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1).
d. Prior Conviction for Murder
South Carolina also recognizes prior murder convictions as
aggravating circumstances.82 This provision, too, has been
construed expansively by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In
State v. Locklair,83 the court held that "prior," as set forth in
South Carolina's death penalty statute, means "prior to trial,
rather than prior to the time of the crime."84 As a result, death-
eligibility can be established on the basis of a murder conviction
that did not exist at the time of the murder for which the death
sentence is sought.
III. THE EMPIRICAL DATA: NEARLY ALL MURDER
OFFENDERS ARE LEGALLY ELIGIBLE FOR A DEATH
SENTENCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The transformation of South Carolina's capital sentencing
scheme from one designed to objectively distinguish the few cases
in which death could be sought from the many in which it could
not, to one in which death is almost always legally available, is
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(d) (1976).
80. 479 S.E.2d 52 (S.C. 1996).
81. Id. at 55 ("That the murder may occur before an armed robbery
actually is completed does not mean that a robbery was not taking place.").
82. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(2).
83. 535 S.E.2d 420 (S.C. 2000).
84. Id. at 428-29.
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illustrated by data collected in Charleston County. Using court
files, contemporary news accounts, and other publicly available
information, researchers assembled profiles of all 151 homicides
that occurred in Charleston County between 2002 and 2007.
These profiles included relevant facts about the circumstances of
the offense, the characteristics of the defendants and victims, and
whether or not the State chose to seek the death penalty.85
Analysis of the Charleston County data in light of S.C. Code
Ann. §16-3-20 and the judicial decisions interpreting it indicates
that of the 151 cases identified, 115-fully 76%-involved facts
that would support the existence of at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance sufficient to render them eligible for
capital prosecution.86 Of those 115 death-eligible cases, only 5-a
mere 4.3% of the total death-eligible pool-were actually
prosecuted as capital cases.87
Strikingly similar results were obtained in Richland County.
Using the same methods described above for the Charleston
County data collection, researchers assembled profiles on 152
85. It should be noted that South Carolina is not unique in the rate at
which it imposes death sentences. A 2002 study, for example, found that the
national average was twenty-one death sentences for every 1000 homicides. At
that time, South Carolina's death sentencing rate was 16 death sentences for
every 1,000 homicides, placing it in twenty-first place among the thirty-eight
states that had a death penalty. Blume, supra note 15, at 297-98.
86. This statistic is a conservative number. First, if a case was
questionable or it otherwise could not be determined whether the facts would
render the case death-eligible, we counted it as not death-eligible. Second, this
statistic does not account for all murders that fit the definition of "physical
torture" as described in subsection II.B.2.a. of this Article. Seemingly any
object used to murder someone would inherently be "a dangerous or deadly
object." Thus, this statistic would be 100% if this factor were accounted for.
87. Only 1 of the 5 capitally prosecuted cases-State v. Dickerson, 535
S.E.2d 119 (S.C. 2000)-resulted in a death sentence, and that outcome,
according to Dickerson's trial attorney, was made possible only by the
defendant's rejection of a life sentence offered by the prosecution. Dickerson
was not "the worst of the worst"; if he were, there would have been no offer to
reject. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). Rather, as the lone recipient of a death sentence from a pool of 115
eligible candidates and 5 actual capital defendants, Dickerson was simply the
rare defendant "struck by lightning."
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total homicide cases that occurred in Richland County between
2000 and 2008. Of those 152 cases, 117-or 77%-involved facts
that would render them death-eligible under South Carolina's
current death penalty statute as interpreted and applied. Out of
the 117 legally death-eligible homicides, only 4-a mere 3.4% of
the death-eligible cases-were actually prosecuted as a capital
case.
These results confirm that South Carolina's present day
capital sentencing scheme possesses the same combination of
defining characteristics that Furman condemned: widely
applicable death-eligibility (76% of cases in Charleston County
and 77% of cases in Richland County), and narrow actual
application of death to eligible cases (4.3% in Charleston County
and 3.4% in Richland County). As a practical matter, South
Carolina's statutory aggravating circumstances can no longer be
relied upon to "adequately differentiate [a capital case] in an
objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way from the
many [South Carolina] murder cases in which the death penalty
may not be imposed."88 Instead, with 76%-77% of all homicides
to choose from, the task of selecting who will live and who will
face the prospect of dying rests exclusively with the prosecutors
who make the charging decisions89-decisions which are as
88. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
89. That prosecutorial discretion plays a disproportionate role in
determining which eligible defendants will be sentenced to death is confirmed
by the substantial disparities in death sentencing among South Carolina
counties. See Blume, supra note 15, at 298-99 ("There is wide variation from
county to county, and from judicial circuit to judicial circuit, in whether the
death penalty will be sought, or obtained. Ten of South Carolina's forty-six
(22%) counties have never produced a death sentence. Other counties, even
though they are relatively large and have, at least comparatively speaking,
significantly more murders, produce very few death sentences. By contrast,
more than one-third of the death sentences imposed in the last ten years arose
from two of the state's sixteen Judicial Circuits. Twenty-four of the sixty-two
(39%) persons sentenced to death from January 1993 to the present came from
either the First Judicial Circuit (Calhoun, Dorchester, and Orangeburg
counties) or the Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Edgefield, Lexington, and Saluda
counties). However, these counties do not have higher homicide rates than other
counties .... Lexington County's death sentencing rate of 11% is approximately
five times greater than the national average and seven times the South
Carolina average of 1.6%. Based on currently available data, Lexington County
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inscrutable, unreviewable, and susceptible to arbitrariness and
bias as those Furman found to be intolerable. As the
jurisprudence described in section II.A. of this Article makes
clear, this is decidedly not what the Supreme Court envisioned
when it upheld the statutory scheme challenged in Gregg.90
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S CAPITAL SENTENCING SYSTEM
PERMITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF RACE IN
VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS
In the long history of capital punishment in the United
States, race has played a large role. Although the more blatant
forms of racial discrimination are less common in capital
prosecutions than they were in the past, there is compelling
empirical evidence that, at least in South Carolina, capital
punishment decisions continue to be influenced by race.
Moreover, the potential for discrimination is exacerbated by four
factors: (1) the breadth of death-eligibility; (2) the frequency with
which juries are exposed to bias-triggering victim impact
evidence; (3) the dearth of African-American decision makers
both as prosecutors and as jurors; and (4) the confusing nature of
the penalty phase instructions received by capital juries. The
resulting distortion of life and death determinations violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.
has the highest death sentencing rate of any large county in the United
States.").
90. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) ("There is no
principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was
imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.").
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A. The History of Race Discrimination in the Imposition of
Capital Punishment
Until the post-Furman era, the history of the imposition of
the death penalty in this country has been dominated by race.
During the Colonial period, many states made eligibility for
capital punishment depend upon the offense committed and the
offender's race, status, or both.91 By the time of the Civil War,
none of the northern states provided for capital punishment for
any crime other than murder, and in many, the institution itself
was questioned, but "[m]uch of the debate that took place in the
North simply did not occur in the South because of the perceived
need to discipline a captive workforce."92 It is telling that in the
first half of the nineteenth century, all of the southern states had
abolished the death penalty for certain previously death-eligible
crimes committed by whites.93 The picture was quite different for
African-American perpetrators. In Texas, African-Americans,
whether slave or free (unlike whites), were subject to capital
punishment for insurrection, arson, attempted murder of a white
victim, rape or attempted rape of a white victim, robbery or
attempted robbery of a white person, and assault with a deadly
weapon upon a white person.94 Free African-Americans were
death-eligible for the kidnapping of a white woman. 95  In
Virginia, free African-Americans (but not whites) could get the
death penalty for rape, attempted rape, kidnapping a woman,
and aggravated assault-all provided the victim was white.
Slaves in Virginia were eligible for death for commission of a
remarkable sixty-six crimes.96 In Mississippi, that number was
91. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 181-82, 256-57, 262-63 (1978).
92. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 137
(2002).
93. Id. at 139. Moreover, the change in practices-for whites-was even
more dramatic than the change in theoretical eligibility: "Between 1800 and
1860 the southern states are known to have executed only seven white burglars
... six white horse thieves.., four white robbers" and no white rapists. Id.
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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thirty-eight,97 and though most southern states did not have such
a staggering number of capital felonies for slaves, all had
statutes that differentiated between crimes that were capital if
committed by a slave but not if committed by a white man.98 In
all slaveholding states, including South Carolina, the rape of a
white woman by a black man was a capital crime.99 In Georgia,
the disparity in penalty was particularly notable; rape of a white
woman by a white man was punishable by imprisonment of
twenty years or less, and attempted rape by not more than five
years, but rape or attempted rape of a white woman by an
African-American was punishable by death.100
Moreover, race of victim disparities, as well as race of
defendant disparities, can be traced to the antebellum period. A
slave could not be raped by her owner at all, and the rape of a
slave by another white man was not punished as rape but as a
trespass against the owner's property.101
Nor were these differences merely unenforced possibilities.
This "black-white divergence in southern criminal codes was
reflected in actual practice."102 In the antebellum South, African-
Americans were hanged in numbers far out of proportion to their
representation in the population and for many more crimes than
were whites.103
After the Civil War, the Black Codes in some states, such as
97. Id.
98. KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-
BELLUM SOUTH 210-11 (1956); see GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS
RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
158-88 (2d ed. 1856).
99. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 142 (8th ed. 2000).
100. LucIus Q. C. LAMAR, A COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA 804 (1821).
101. FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 99, at 141. Indeed, in antebellum
Louisiana, the rape of a black woman, whether slave or free, was no crime at
all. JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF LOUISIANA 85-87 (1994).
102. BANNER, supra note 92, at 141.
103. Id.
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South Carolina, served to punish African-Americans by death for
crimes that incurred lesser punishments for white offenders.104
In other states, such as Georgia, the same discrimination was
accomplished by facially neutral statutes that accomplished the
same discrimination by making the death penalty available at
the discretion of the jury.105 The Fourteenth Amendment did
away with the formal sources of discrimination, as it was
intended,106 but left untouched the disparate applications made
possible by discretion. From 1930, when national statistics were
first kept, to 1972, when the Supreme Court struck down
unguided discretion statutes, about half of the defendants
executed for murder in the United States were African-American,
a number which is clearly disproportionate, whether considered
in comparison to their proportion in the population or in the
ranks of murderers. Even that sizable disparity pales when
compared to the racial disparity in executions for rape: of the 455
men executed for rape, 405-or 89%-were African-American
men.107 Virtually all of these men were accused of raping white
women. 108
These stark raw numbers reflect disparities that persisted
even when possible confounding factors were investigated. When
the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP commissioned a
104. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 84-85 (1997);
see also THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 97, 105-
06 (1965) (discussing North Carolina law).
105. WILSON, supra note 104, at 101, 104-05, 113-14.
106. When Senator Howard introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the
Senate, he described it as "prohibit[ing] the hanging of a black man for a crime
for which the white man is not to be hanged." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2766 (1866).
107. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN No. 45, NATIONAL
PRISONER STATISTICS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1930-1968, at 7 tbl.1 (1969).
Unofficial statistics from the longer period of 1864 to 1972 are similar. Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty Before and After
McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 37-38 (2007).
108. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND
OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 440 (1994). Indeed, it
appears that no white man has ever been executed for raping a black victim.
Michael L. Radelet, Executions of Whites for Crimes Against Blacks: Exceptions
to the Rule?, 30 SOC. Q. 529, 537-41 (1989).
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comprehensive study by Professor Marvin Wolfgang of capital
rape prosecutions between 1945 and 1965, Wolfgang considered
over two dozen possibly aggravating nonracial factors and
concluded that none of those variables accounted for racial
disparities.109 Controlling for those factors, "[African-American]
defendants whose victims were white were sentenced to death
approximately eighteen times more frequently than... any other
racial combination of defendant and victim."110
Thus, it was not surprising that the influence of race on
capital sentencing was one of the factors that led the Supreme
Court to overturn Georgia's standardless death penalty.i"'
Moreover, when the Court upheld remodeled death penalty
statutes in Gregg v. Georgia,112 it did so on the rationale that the
new statutes channeled the sentencer's discretion, thus
minimizing the risk that race-or other arbitrary factors-would
influence the imposition of the death penalty.113
Unfortunately, the newer statutes did not eliminate racial
disparities in the imposition of capital punishment in this state-
or in any other. Raymond Paternoster conducted a
comprehensive analysis of all the death penalty prosecutions in
the state of South Carolina between 1977 and 1981.114 After
controlling for a host of variables, Paternoster found that the
odds of being charged with capital murder in South Carolina
during that period were 9.6 times greater in white victim cases
109. Marvin E. Wolfgang & Marc Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the
Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 119, 126-33 (1973).
110. Id. at 130.
111. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(discussing the history of racial discrimination in the imposition of the death
penalty); id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that discretion permits
prejudice to determine who receives the death penalty); id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[Ilf any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be
sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.").
112. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
113. Id. at 206-07.
114. Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The
Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983).
505
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than in black victim cases.11 5 A meta-analysis of the relationship
between race and the death penalty was conducted by the United
States General Accounting Office, which concluded that most
studies found that the race of the victim significantly influenced
the imposition of the death penalty and that a sizeable minority
of studies also found that the race of the defendant played a
significant role.116
B. The Legal Standard for Evaluating Evidence of Racial
Discrimination
When the Supreme Court first considered a study
documenting such racial disparities, in McCleskey v. Kemp,117 it
held that general statistical evidence showing that a particular
state's capital punishment scheme operated in a discriminatory
manner did not establish a constitutional violation.118 McCleskey
did not, however, exempt capital punishment from the ordinary
constitutional prohibitions against racial discrimination. Rather,
it held that because the large number of actors and aspects of the
capital sentencing process increased the likelihood that factors
other than race were responsible for racial disparities,119 general
statistical evidence was not sufficient to establish discrimination
that would violate either the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
115. Id. at 782-83. See also Michael Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of
Race, Gender and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty
in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161 (2006) (concluding that South Carolina
prosecutors are 3 times more likely to seek the death penalty in white victim
cases than in black victim cases); John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T.
Wells, Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165 (2004) (noting a significant black defendant/white
victim effect in explaining the racial makeup of death row in South Carolina as
well as other states).
116. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990) (reviewing all previous
studies), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatll/140845.pdf.
117. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
118. Id. at 317-19.
119. Id. at 294-95.
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 120
In contrast, racial discrimination claims that focus on the
actions of a particular prosecutor (or judge or juror), do not suffer
from the confounding influence of multiple actors and multiple
stages, nor do they lack the evidence "specific to [the defendant's]
own case" that the Supreme Court found lacking in McCleskey.121
Allegations of selective prosecution based on race must be
evaluated in light of "ordinary equal protection standards."122
Under those "ordinary equal protection standards," a death-
eligible defendant need not prove discriminatory intent by direct
evidence.123 Rather, "invidious discriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of relevant facts."124 The
appropriate analysis "demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available"125 because race-based discrimination is rarely
announced publicly and those responsible for key decisions may
have "[m]ore subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes."126
Such attitudes are especially problematic when, as in the
decision to seek the death penalty, those responsible for the
decision are entrusted with broad discretion.27
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court provided guidance
concerning the proof of covert forms of intentional discrimination.
Where the pattern of discrimination is stark, evidence of the
impact alone is determinative. "Sometimes a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation
120. Id. at 292-93.
121. Id.
122. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996); see also Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,
232 (1985).
123. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); see also Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
124. Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.
125. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
126. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
127. Id.
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appears neutral on its face."128
When impact is not so stark, a number of factors may
contribute to a prima facie showing of racially discriminatory
intent. Those factors include, but are not limited to, "the impact
of the official action,"129 (even when short of "clear pattern"
evidence); "the historical background of the decision
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes";130 "departures from the normal procedural
sequence";131 "[s]ubstantive departures . . . , particularly if the
factors usually considered important by the decision-maker
strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached";32 and
"contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body."133
C. Evidence that Race Infects the Administration of Capital
Punishment in South Carolina
"[S]ensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available"34 compels the conclusion
that the administration of the death penalty in South Carolina is
not color blind. At least four of the Arlington Heights indicia are
present, and together they establish the purposeful
discrimination prohibited by both the Equal Protection and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses.
128. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding that ordinances that gave unfettered discretion to
county officials regarding the operation of laundries was unconstitutional where
the effect was discrimination against Chinese laundry owners).
129. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (stating Arlington Heights supplies the proper analysis for
selective prosecution claims).
130. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 268.
134. Id. at 266.
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1. The Impact of Official Action
As alluded to previously, in the wake of South Carolina's
post-Furman death penalty reform, Raymond Paternoster
conducted a statewide comprehensive analysis of all the death
penalty prosecutions between 1977 and 1981. He found
disparities even more striking than those reported in McCleskey.
In Georgia, the odds of being charged with capital murder were
about 4 times as great when the victim was white, but in South
Carolina, the odds were more than 9 times greater in white
victim cases than in black victim cases. 135 Paternoster's early
post-Gregg findings of racial disparities in the imposition of
South Carolina's death penalty have since been corroborated by
at least three different methods. Most simply, one can compare
the racial composition of death row to the racial composition of
the population. African-Americans comprise slightly less than
30% of South Carolina's population;136 yet, as of January 1, 2009,
they constituted over half of the inmates on the state's death
row. 137
Another possible comparison is between homicides and death
sentences, and this comparison also yields strong racial
disparities. Utilizing the FBI database, a comparison of all
homicide cases from 1977 to 1998 with cases that resulted in
death sentences reveals that African-Americans who kill whites
are sentenced to death at approximately three times the rate of
whites who kill whites.138 Close analysis shows two powerful
forms of discrimination at work in the South Carolina capital
punishment scheme. First, the death penalty is rarely sought (or
obtained) when the murder victim is African-American. Only
135. See generally Paternoster, supra note 114.
136. See U.S. Census Bureau Fact Sheet, http://factfinder.cens us.gov on
sidebar under "Fact Sheet" menu.
137. Of the 63 death row inmates, 33 were African-Americans. NAACP,
DEATH Row USA: A QUARTERLY REPORT BY THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT
OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC. 35 (Winter 2009),
availableat http://naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA-winter_2009.pdf.
138. Blume, supra note 15, at 306.
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0.46% of black victim cases result in a death sentence, in contrast
to white victim cases, where 3.4% result in the death penalty.139
Thus, a person charged with killing someone who is white is
seven times more likely to be sentenced to death than a person
charged with killing an African-American. Secondly, within
white victim cases, African-American defendants are disparately
prosecuted: "[A]n African American charged with killing a white
person is approximately six times more likely to be sentenced to
death than cases involving any other race of victim/defendant
combination."140
A third kind of study has focused on local, identified decision
makers. Statistical analyses have been conducted in at least
three South Carolina counties, and in every county studied,
prosecutors have been found to discriminate on the basis of race
in their decisions about whether to seek the death penalty. An
examination of all homicide cases in Charleston County from
1981-1990 (the time period during which South Carolina
Attorney General Charlie Condon was solicitor) revealed that the
prosecution sought the death penalty in 10 of 25 cases (40%) in
which the defendant was African-American and the victim was
white, and only 2 of 70 cases (2.9%) in which the defendant and
the victim were both African-American, producing a pattern that
"would occur by chance less than one time in a thousand."141
Moreover, Mr. Condon sought the death penalty in 32% of all
white victim cases and 5% of all black victim cases, another
139. Id. at 307; see also, David McCord, A Year in the Life of Death: Murders
and Capital Sentences in South Carolina, 1998, 53 S.C. L. REV. 249, 296-97
(2002) (finding strong race of victim effects over shorter period of time).
140. Blume, supra note 15, at 307. These conclusions were confirmed by a
2004 study of all homicides in several states, including South Carolina, from
1977 to 1998, See Blume et al., supra note 115. The study revealed that, even
though most murder victims are African-American, only 0.46% of black victim
cases result in a death sentence, while 3.4% of white victim cases resulted in a
death sentence. See id. at 197 tbl.8. Thus, a person charged with killing a
white victim is 8 times more likely to be sentenced to death than a person
charged with killing an African-American. Second, African-American's are
generally more likely to be sentenced to death regardless of the race of their
victims. Id.
141. John H. Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination in Capital
Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1771, 1782 (1998).
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statistical discrepancy which "would occur by chance less than
one time in one thousand."142 Another statistical study revealed
that in Lexington County, the solicitor had sought death in 10%
of the white victim cases but had never sought death in a black
victim case. 143
In the most sophisticated study, Theodore Eisenberg
compiled information concerning all homicide cases that occurred
in the Seventh Judicial Circuit from 1993 through 1997 and for
each case, determined
the race of the defendant, the race of the victim, the presence of
aggravating factors that would render the crime death-eligible,
and whether a notice of intent to seek death was filed. For the
period between 1977 and 1993, [Professor Eisenberg] found
that the [circuit's] solicitor sought death in fifty percent of the
(fifty-two) death-eligible white victim cases and in zero percent
of the (nineteen) death-eligible black victim cases .... Such a
result would occur by chance about four times in one hundred
thousand. [Professor Eisenberg] also isolated the cases that
occurred when Holman Gossett was solicitor, the period of
1985 to 1993, and found that Gossett decided to seek death in
forty-three percent of the death eligible white victim cases, and
in zero percent of the black victim cases. This result ... would
occur only six times in ten thousand as a matter of chance. 144
"Moreover," as found in the state-wide study by John Blume,
"the defendant-victim combination most likely to result in the
decision to seek the death penalty was a black defendant/white
victim pairing."145
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1790.
144. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigation for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v.
Kemp, 39 COLuM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 178. 181-82 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. Professor Eisenberg later testified about his findings in a capital
case in South Carolina. Id.
Because [the case in which he testified] involved armed robbery,
Professor Eisenberg separately considered armed robbery cases, and
found that the propensity to seek death in white victim cases was also
very pronounced in this subset. Looking at the longer period, the
resulting disparity would occur by chance only in eight out of one
Capital Sentencing Regime
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 511 2009-2010
Although no formal study has been done in Richland County,
the racial impact of the official actions taken by Solicitor Giese is
dramatic. African-American males in the Richland County
community are being noticed for death-and white defendants
are not. Solicitor Giese has managed to maintain a record of
100% discretionary use of the death penalty against non-white
defendants, thereby singling out non-white, primarily African-
American, defendants for the ultimate penalty of death. Put
simply, life and death decisions line up perfectly with the color of
the defendant's skin.
Impact is circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent,
and in this case, in at least two counties it rises to the level of a
sufficiently "stark" disparate effect that impact alone is sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In Richland
County, as in Yick Wo,146 where the ordinance regulating
laundries was applied only to Chinese laundry owners, "a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face."147 During the entire period of
Solicitor Giese's term, he never sought the death penalty against
a white defendant despite the existence of a pool of white
defendants whose offenses included an aggravating
circumstance. Likewise, Solicitor Gossett maintained a racially
pure pool of capital case victims for eight years.
2. Historical Background
Even aside from the stark patterns presented above, the
historical backdrop of discrimination in South Carolina as a
whole supplements the undeniably powerful statistical evidence.
The "distorting effects of racial discrimination"148 are at work in
thousand cases, and looking at the shorter period of Holman Gossett's
tenure as solicitor, one time in one hundred.
Id.
146. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
147. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977).
148. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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this state. South Carolina has a long history of blatant racial
discrimination in the selection of persons for execution.149 By
and large the most egregious, or at least the shamelessly open,
race-based decision making in capital prosecution is in the past.
It is, however, still relevant in assessing the likelihood that
purposeful discrimination is the cause of racial disparities.
3. Departures from the Normal Procedural Sequence
Among the most basic criminal procedural rights is the
entitlement to a jury trial. Juries must be selected in a race-
neutral manner,150 but at least some South Carolina prosecutors
have violated this most basic right when exercising peremptory
challenges in capital cases. A study of the use of peremptory
challenges in Lexington County capital cases conducted by
Professor William Jacoby of the University of South Carolina
found systematic elimination of potential black jurors.151 In fact,
the study concluded that the statistical likelihood that racial
discrimination did not explain the disparity was less than one in
a billion.152 This statistical evidence was supported by the
observations of several local attorneys, inclding that of a public
defender who in fourteen years had never tried a black defendant
case in Lexington county in which an African-American served
on the jury.153
In the post-Furman period, at least twelve African-American
defendants were convicted and sentenced to death by all-white
juries in South Carolina;154 two such sentences occurred in the
149. See Margaret O'Shea, Race Plays Into Death Penalty Use, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Nov. 14, 1999, at Al.
150. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
151. Blume et al., supra note 141, at 1792.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1792 n.112.
154. These defendants are: J.D. Gleaton, Larry Gilbert, Sterling Spann,
Andrew Smith, Donald Jones, Raymond Patterson, Theodore Kelly, Richard
Stewart, Albert Thompson, Jeffrey Jones, Andre Rosemond, and Richard Moore.
In several of these cases, the selection of an all-white jury was never reviewed
on appeal due to procedural default by trial counsel. See Blume, supra note 15,
2010]
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 513 2009-2010
twenty-first century. 155 Given the population of South Carolina,
which is nearly 30% African-American, and the constitutional
command of racial neutrality in jury selection, these statistics
establish a departure from normal procedures.
4. Substantive Departures
Often, the decision to seek death in black defendant/white
victim cases itself constitutes a substantive departure due to the
relatively unaggravated nature of the case. For example, the
state sought death for Earl Matthews despite the fact that he
was only nineteen at the time of the offense, had a minimal prior
record, and the case arose from a botched armed robbery where
only the armed robbery aggravator was present.156 Holman
Gossett's decision to seek death against Keith Simpson under
similar circumstances was likewise a substantive departure.157
5. Contemporary Statements by Decision Makers
In some cases, statements by decision makers have produced
anomalously direct evidence of racial discrimination in the death
penalty process. In a recent Lexington County case, the
prosecutor referred to a large African-American capital
defendant as "King-Kong."158 Earl Matthews, a death-sentenced
inmate from Charleston County, presented anecdotal evidence,
as well as a statistical study, to support his claim of racial bias in
his federal habeas corpus proceedings.159 A former assistant
prosecutor in the Charleston County Solicitor's office at the time
of Matthew's trial declared that the office had prosecuted
homicide cases in a racially discriminatory manner, treating
at 308.
155. Richard Moore was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white
jury in Spartanburg in 2001. Id. at 308 n.145. Kevin Mercer was convicted and
sentenced to death by an all-white jury in Lexington County in 2006. See
Transcript of Record, State v. Mercer (2003-GS-32-0409) (on file with authors).
156. State v. Matthews, 373 S.E.2d 587, 589 (S.C. 1988).
157. See State v. Simpson, 479 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1996).
158. State v. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d 281, 285 (S.C. 2006).
159. Blume et al., supra note 141, at 1782-83.
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cases involving black victims as less important than cases
involving white victims.160 Another former prosecutor similarly
declared that she heard a colleague say at a staff meeting that a
particular case deserved less priority because the victim was
"just a little old black man."161 Louis Truesdale, who was accused
of murdering a young white woman in Lancaster County, was
executed in 1998 despite uncontradicted evidence that jurors
openly used racial slurs during deliberations at the sentencing
phase of his trial.62 Similarly, Johnny Bennett developed
evidence in his post-conviction proceedings that a juror who
served on his capital trial thought Bennett committed the crime
because he was "just a dumb nigger."163 There have also been
shocking examples of discrimination by defense lawyers. In one
case, appointed counsel referred to his African-American client as
a "big black... buck."164
One last example is particularly instructive. Theodore Kelly
was convicted and sentenced to death for a double homicide in
Spartanburg County, South Carolina.165 After an unsuccessful
direct appeal, Kelly's lawyer serendipitously66 elicited the
following testimony from the deputy solicitor:
I told [Solicitor Gossett] that I felt like the black
community would be upset though if we did not seek the death
penalty because there were two black victims in this case....
The only mention that was ever made of race was when I said
that I felt like if we did not seek the death penalty, that the
community, the black community would be upset because we
are seeking the death penalty in the (Andre) Rosemond case for
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Carrie Armstrong, Truesdale Executed for Murder, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 12, 1998, at B1.
163. See Bennett Post-Conviction Relief Hearing Transcript Record at 9
(2006-CP-40-5751) (on file with authors).
164. Application for Post-Conviction Relief at 23, State v. Butler, 290 S.E.2d
420 (S.C.1982) (on file with authors).
165. State v. Kelly, 502 S.E.2d 99, 102 (S.C. 1998).
166. The deputy solicitor had been deposed prior to the hearing and had not
revealed the information at that time.
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the murder of two white people. 167
The post-conviction relief court found that these statements
revealed an impermissible racial motivation in the decision to
seek death. It is worth noting that the solicitor in this case,
Holman Gossett-as revealed in Eisenberg's statistical study-
had never previously sought death in a black victim case. Once it
is known that Gossett was influenced by race in Kelly's case, it
seems extraordinarily unlikely that Kelly was the only case in
which race colored his thinking.
Although the obvious influence of race in these examples may
occur in only a handful of cases, we think that their occurrence
likely points to a much broader underlying current of racial bias
which is likely exacerbated by the broad discretion afforded to
decision makers under South Carolna's capital sentencing
scheme. Other studies have conclusively shown that racial
prejudice has a more profound effect when the decision maker is
afforded a great amount of discretion.168 Likewise, when the
strong statistical disparities that characterize the South Carolina
capital punishment system are taken into account with the other
evidence of purposeful racial discrimination-history, procedural
departures, substantive departures, and contemporary
statements by decision makers-it is clear that the system is
impermissibly tainted by racial bias.
D. South Carolina's Capital Punishment System Poses a
Constitutionally Unacceptable Risk of Racial Bias, Thereby
Violating the Due Process Clause
When a practice creates an "unacceptable risk of racial
prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding,"169 due
process is violated. In Turner, the Supreme Court held that the
refusal to voir dire jurors about racial prejudice in an interracial
167. State v. Kelly, No. 99-CP-42-1174, at 38 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Oct. 6, 2003)
(order granting relief).
168. See, e.g., Jennifer Eberhardt, et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived
Stereotypicality of Black Defendant Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17
PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 5 (2006).
169. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (emphasis omitted).
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capital case created just such a risk.70 The Court's judgment
that this refusal created an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice
infecting the capital sentencing proceeding was "based on a
conjunction of three factors: the fact that the crime charged
involved interracial violence, the broad discretion given to the
jury at the death penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of
the risk of improper sentencing in a capital case."171 At least in
interracial capital crimes, four South Carolina practices create
an analogously unacceptable risk.
1. The Broad, Virtually Untrammeled Discretion Which South
Carolina Prosecutors Possess and with Which Capital Jurors
are Charged
Part I demonstrates that South Carolina's capital sentencing
statute, as written by the legislature and construed by the South
Carolina Supreme Court, does not perform the constitutionally
mandated narrowing function. This is inherently impermissible
because it produces arbitrariness, but it also unacceptably
increases the risk that race will influence capital sentencing
decisions.
As the Baldus Study of Georgia's death penalty revealed,
race effects are most pronounced in the middle range of cases.172
In contrast, at high levels of aggravation, race does not seem to
play a role in selecting who is sentenced to death:
One of the lessons of the Baldus study is that there exist
certain categories of extremely serious crimes for which
prosecutors consistently seek, and juries consistently impose,
the death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or
the race of the offender. If Georgia were to narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants to those categories, the danger of
170. Id. at 36-37.
171. Id. at 37.
172. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 n.29 (1987) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) ("McCleskey's case falls in [a] grey area where . ..
you would find the greatest likelihood that some inappropriate consideration
may have come to bear on the decision.").
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arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty
would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.173
This pattern-racial disparity in close cases-is both consistent
with older empirical findings from field studies and corroborated
by mock jury studies. Kalven and Zeisel's classic work, The
American Jury, reported that, in weaker cases, "[t]he closeness of
the evidence makes it possible for the jury to respond to
sentiment by liberating it from the discipline of the evidence."174
[T]he jury does not often consciously and explicitly yield to
sentiment in the teeth of the law . . . it yields to sentiment in
the apparent process of resolving doubts as to evidence. The
jury, therefore, is able to conduct its revolt from the law within
the etiquette of resolving issues of fact.175
Likewise, mock jury studies, which have the virtue of perfect
control, have found that racial bias is more often influential in
cases with marginal evidence.176 Thus, one can confidently
predict that as the class of cases in which the death penalty is
permissible grows larger, more and more cases will be unclear
and consequently, will permit the jury to resort to "sentiment"
produced by the race of the defendant, the race of the victim, or
both.
Four of the nine members of the McCleskey court found the
risk presented by the Georgia statute constitutionally
impermissible.177 Because the South Carolina legislature and
courts have expanded death eligibility in South Carolina
substantially beyond that encompassed by the Georgia statute at
the time McCleskey was decided, race continues to infect
decisions of life and death in this state.
173. Id. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 326 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
HARRY KALVEN, JR. ET AL., THE AMERICAN JURY 165 (1966)).
175. Id. (alteration in original).
176. See, e.g., Denis Chimaeze E. Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors
in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
133, 139 (1979).
177. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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2. Victim Impact
The risk that racial bias will infect the capital sentencing
decision is further exacerbated by South Carolina's embrace of
victim impact evidence. Viewed in isolation, victim impact
evidence does not violate the Constitution.178 Nonetheless, its
admissibility may contribute to a constitutionally cognizable risk
that racial bias may infect a state's system of capital
punishment. As the dissent in Payne noted,
Evidence offered to prove such differences can only be intended
to identify some victims as more worthy of protection than
others. Such proof risks decisions based on the same invidious
motives as a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty if a
victim is white but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is
black.179
The majority rejected this view, reasoning,
[a]s a general matter, however, victim impact evidence is not
offered to encourage comparative judgments of this kind-for
instance, that the killer of a hardworking, devoted parent
deserves the death penalty, but that the murderer of a
reprobate does not. It is designed to show instead each victim's
"uniqueness as an individual human being," whatever the jury
might think the loss to the community resulting from his death
might be. 180
In South Carolina, however, much broader victim impact
testimony and argument is permitted, and the breadth of the
admissibility rules enhance the likelihood that racial bias will
result from the jury's contemplation of victim impact evidence.181
Most notably, a solicitor is permitted to make comparisons
178. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) ("[If] the State chooses to
permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on
that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.").
179. Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 823.
181. See John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in
Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 257 (2003).
Capital Sentencing Regime
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 519 2009-2010
between the defendant's character and the victim's character-a
comparison that is highly likely to stir up racial bias in
interracial crime cases.18 2 Thus, this factor also contributes to
the unacceptable risk of racial bias created by the South Carolina
capital punishment system.
3. The Racial Identity of the Decision Makers
All of the solicitors in South Carolina are white, as are
virtually all of the assistant solicitors. Moreover, in the post-
Furman period, at least twelve African-American defendants
were convicted and sentenced to death by all-white juries.
Under these circumstances, mock jury studies show that
racial bias is far more likely to affect the fate of African-
American defendants.183
Nor is the expression of bias by white jurors against black
defendants solely a laboratory phenomenon. An all-white jury is
significantly more likely to impose death than is a racially mixed
jury, and a black defendant/white victim case is much more likely
to result in a death sentence when the jury is heavily white.184
182. See Humphries v. State, 570 S.E.2d 160, 168 (S.C. 2002) (holding that
Payne only "prohibits comparisons that suggest that there are worthy and
unworthy victims," not comparisons between the worth of the defendant and the
worth of the victim); see also State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328, 331-32 (S.C. 1998)
(upholding the admissibility of photographs of the deceased unborn child of the
victim dressed in clothes his mother had purchased in anticipation of his birth).
183. Netta Shaked-Schroer et al., Reducing Racial Bias in the Penalty Phase
of Capital Trials, 26 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 603, 603 (2008) (demonstrating no
correlation between sentence and the defendant's race for non-white jurors, but
white jurors were more likely to sentence African-American defendants to
death); Thomas W. Brewer, Race and Jurors' Receptivity to Mitigation in
Capital Cases: The Effect of Jurors, Defendants', and Victims' Race in
Combination, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 529, 539-40 (2004) (demonstrating white
jurors are less receptive to mitigation in black defendant/white victim cases
than are African-American jurors); John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Attitudes and
the Death Penalty, 27 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1468, 1480 (1997) (demonstrating
white mock jurors more likely to impose death penalty on African-American
defendants than on white defendants).
184. William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 191-96 (2001); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
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Thus, the fact that South Carolina prosecutors and jurors are
overwhelmingly white further increases the likelihood that race
will influence the assessment of death-worthiness.
4. The Confusing Nature of South Carolina Jury Instructions
According to Capital Jury Project data, confusion on key
matters is common in jurors who have served on capital cases in
South Carolina:
[S]ubstantial minorities of jurors believed that the law
required them to impose the death penalty if the crime was
"heinous, vile or depraved" or if the evidence proved the
defendant would be dangerous in the future. Many jurors who
survive the death-qualification process also are unable to
consider evidence in mitigation of punishment which the law
requires them to consider.
[J]urors do not understand the sentencing phase
instructions and are mistaken about most key concepts of
aggravation and mitigation, which are the cornerstone of the
Supreme Court's belief that a capital sentencing jury's
discretion can be suitably limited and channeled. For example,
the sentencing phase of a capital case begins with many jurors
presuming that the death penalty is the correct punishment, or
with a "presumption of death." Furthermore, a significant
number of jurors do not understand that aggravating
circumstances must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Many jurors believe that the jury must unanimously agree that
a mitigating circumstance has been established before it can be
considered even though the United States Supreme Court has
clearly said otherwise. More than half of the South Carolina
jurors interviewed [wrongly] believed that the defendant was
required to establish a mitigating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt. 185
1538, 1559 (1998) (demonstrating the race of the defendant influences jurors'
perceptions of future dangerousness).
185. Blume, supra note 15, at 316 (reviewing the literature). See also,
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions
in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) (finding 20% of jurors on
20101
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The failure of jurors to adequately comprehend such
important features of capital punishment law, in and of itself,
threatens the legitimacy of the death penalty. But this confusion
is especially pernicious because of its racial consequences.
Although confusing jury instructions did not affect white mock
jurors sentences of white defendants, one study found that
confusing instructions increased the likelihood that white jurors
would vote for a death sentence for black defendants.186
Similarly, other researchers found that mock jurors who
understood the instructions treated black and white defendants
equally, but mock jurors who had poor comprehension of the
instructions sentenced black defendants to death 50% more often
than they sentenced white defendants to death.187
Thus, the lack of clarity in penalty phase instructions, like
the breadth of death-eligibility, the racial identity of the decision
makers, and the wide latitude given victim impact evidence,
increases the risk that racial bias will infect jury deliberations in
capital proceedings. Together, these aspects of capital
punishment in South Carolina create "unacceptable risk of racial
prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding."188
V. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT
CONSISTENTLY FAILS TO FULFILL ITS STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION TO CONDUCT
MEANINGFUL PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN CAPITAL
CASES
As explained in Parts II and III, South Carolina's capital
sentencing statute fails to perform the constitutionally required
narrowing function on the "front end" required by Furman and
its progeny. Because the statute allows the prosecution to seek
capital juries believe that an aggravating factor can be established by a
preponderance of the evidence or only to a juror's personal satisfaction).
186. Shaked-Schroer, supra note 183, at 611.
187. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional
Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 337, 349-50 (2000).
188. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986).
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the death penalty in virtually any murder case, the decision
whether or not to seek the death penalty in murder cases is
placed in the unbridled hands of the circuit solicitors. The
evidence also reveals that the "selection" decision (i.e., whether to
seek or impose a death sentence) is also tainted by race and other
arbitrary factors. These defects on the "front end" are
exacerbated by the South Carolina Supreme Court's failure to
adequately monitor and regulate the capital sentencing scheme
on the "back end." The most notable defect in the state supreme
court's appellate review of capital cases is its failure to engage in
anything resembling meaningful proportionality review of death
sentences. This section discusses the constitutional implications
of the "back end" problem caused by the court's lack of oversight.
A. The Importance of Meaningful Proportionality Review
South Carolina's death penalty statute mandates the South
Carolina Supreme Court review all death sentences to determine
"whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant."189 The statutorily required proportionality
review is intended to serve as "[a]n additional check against the
random imposition of the death penalty."190 Meaningful
proportionality review can "substantially eliminatef the
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of
an aberrant jury."191 A robust proportionality review helps to
ensure that capital punishment is "limited to those offenders who
commit 'a narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose
extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution."'192
Of course, proportionality review can only be meaningful to
the extent that a reviewing court makes a thorough comparison
189. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (2003).
190. State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807 (S.C. 1979).
191. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976).
192. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. -. , 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008)
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
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of the outcomes in similar cases for similarly situated
defendants. The only logical method for an adequate
proportionality review is to engage in a comparison not only of
similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed but similar
cases in which the death penalty was not imposed. Justice
Stevens recently pointed out that this approach is "judicious
because, quite obviously, a significant number of similar cases in
which death was not imposed might well provide the most
relevant evidence of arbitrariness in the sentence before the
court."193
Consideration of life cases is consistent with the United
States Supreme Court's approval of Georgia's amended capital
sentencing scheme after Furman in Gregg v. Georgia.194 One of
Georgia's new procedures was a requirement that the Georgia
Supreme Court conduct a proportionality review of the sentences
imposed on similarly situated defendants.195 The Court pointed
out that proportionality review was "an additional provision
designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on
a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants."196 The
Court was reassured by Georgia's claim that "if the death penalty
is only rarely imposed for an act or it is substantially out of line
with sentences imposed for other acts it will be set aside as
excessive."97 The Court pointed to Georgia Supreme Court's
demonstrated willingness to overturn death sentences on
proportionality grounds as evidence that the court had "taken its
review responsibilities seriously."198 Finally, the Court
concluded:
193. Walker v. Georgia, 554 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 453, 454-55 (2008)
(statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
194. 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)
(approving Florida's revised capital sentencing statute).
195. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198.
196. Id. at 204.
197. Id. at 205 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 616 (Ga. 1974)).
198. Id.; see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253 ("The Supreme Court of Florida,
like that of Georgia, has not hesitated to vacate a death sentence when it has
determined that the sentence should not have been imposed. Indeed, it has
vacated 8 of the 21 death sentences that it has reviewed to date.").
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[P]roportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an
aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not
impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the
appellate review procedures assure that no defendant
convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of
death. 199
Justice Stevens has explained that the Gregg Court naturally
assumed that Georgia "would consider whether there were
'similarly situated defendants' who had not been put to death
because that inquiry is an essential part of any meaningful
proportionality review."200 The Court confirmed its expectation
in Zant v. Stephens,201 when it emphasized that its decision to
uphold a Georgia death sentence, notwithstanding the jury's
reliance on an invalid aggravating circumstance, "depend[ed] in
part on the existence of an important procedural safeguard, the
mandatory appellate review of each death sentence by the
Georgia Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure
proportionality."202 The Court reached its conclusion in Zant only
after the Georgia Supreme Court expressly stated, in response to
the Court's certified question, that Georgia uses both life and
death cases for comparison purposes under its proportionality
review.203
Thus, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence confirms that
meaningful proportionality review is an important procedural
safeguard against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
under a capital sentencing scheme like South Carolina's.204 The
199. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206.
200. Walker v. Georgia, 554 U.S. -, 129 S. Ct. 453, 454 (2008) (statement
of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
201. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
202. Id. at 890; see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court of
Florida, like its Georgia counterpart, considers its function to be to [guarantee]
that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in one case will reach
a similar result to that reached under similar circumstances in another
case .... ) (alteration in original).
203. Zant, 462 U.S. at 880 n.19.
204. As explained in Part I, South Carolina's death penalty statute was
Capital Sentencing Regime
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need is even greater, however, when viewed in conjunction with
the remainder of South Carolina's scheme, which fails to
meaningfully narrow the pool of death-eligible cases, limit
prosecutorial selection of death cases, ensure that death
sentences are not imposed in a racially discriminatory manner,
channel the jury's discretion in weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors, and prevent abusive use of overly prejudicial
victim impact evidence. The systemic flaws discussed previously
in this Article result in the arbitrary and discriminatory
imposition of death sentences in South Carolina that, standing
alone, violate the Eighth Amendment. In addition, these failures
simultaneously heighten South Carolina's obligation to conduct
proportionality review in a meaningful way and highlight its
consistent failure to do so.
B. The South Carolina Supreme Court Invariably Fails To
Conduct Meaningful Proportionality Review
Notwithstanding its statutory obligation to compare
sentences imposed in "similar" cases, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has determined that it will only consider other
cases in which the death penalty was imposed, thereby ignoring
hundreds of other cases involving similar crimes and similarly
situated defendants.205 The court has rejected the view of other
jurisdictions that the appropriate "universe of cases" includes
both those in which the death penalty was not imposed as well as
those in which it was. 206 The court has noted that "[t]here is,
after all, some logic to the view that the heinous crime is sui
modeled after and is virtually identical to the Georgia statute approved in
Gregg. The Court has stated that the Eighth Amendment does not require
comparative proportionality review where other statutory procedures
adequately channel the sentencer's discretion. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 306 (1987); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-57 (1984). But that
assertion merely conveys the Court's "recognition of differences among the
States' capital schemes," and it "was not meant to undermine [the Court's]
conclusion in Gregg and Zant that such review is an important component of
the Georgia scheme." Walker, 129 S. Ct. at 456 (statement of Stevens, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari).
205. See, e.g., State v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63, 74 (S.C. 1982).
206. Id.
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generis, simply beyond comparison."207 But this view is
inconsistent with the court's constitutional and statutory
obligation to make that comparison.208 Moreover, the court's
method is illogical and tautological. Since the death penalty was
reinstated in South Carolina in 1977, the court has never
determined that any of the 176 death sentences imposed was
excessive or disproportionate. Each case that is affirmed
decreases the likelihood that any subsequent sentence will be
found disproportionate because of the fact that another case, to
which some future case may be similar, has entered the
comparison pool.
A survey of the court's proportionality analysis reveals a
perfunctory inquiry. Its undertaking uniformly consists of the
same single sentence, or a slight variation thereof, repeated at
the end of every opinion affirming a sentence of death: "[A]
review of similar cases illustrates that imposing the death
sentence in this case would be neither excessive nor
disproportionate in light of the crime and the defendant."209 The
207. Id. at 72.
208. In further support of its limited proportionality analysis, the court has
said that including life cases in the comparison pool would result in "pure
conjecture" and that the court will not subject death verdicts to "scrutiny in
pursuit of phantom 'similar cases."' Id. at 74. And yet, the Court has no
difficulty conjuring up "phantom similar cases" in affirming death sentences.
Id. On several occasions, the court has failed to find any similar cases for
comparison purposes but nonetheless affirmed on the conclusory basis that the
death sentence was simply "appropriate." See e.g., State v. Passaro, 567 S.E.2d
862, 868 (S.C. 2002) (finding no similar cases but affirming on the grounds that
it had affirmed other death sentences where the victim was under the age of
eleven and defendant's crime was "no less gruesome than those"); Copeland, 300
S.E.2d at 77 (finding no similar case exists that would permit meaningful
comparative review but that "we are satisfied that the sentence of death
imposed on each of these appellants was appropriate and neither excessive nor
disproportionate in light of their crimes and their respective characters"); State
v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799, 807 (S.C. 1979) (finding no similar cases existed, but
the death sentence was appropriate and not excessive considering the crime and
the defendants).
209. E.g., State v. Stanko, 658 S.E.2d 94, 98 (S.C. 2008); State v. Stone, 655
S.E.2d 487, 489 (S.C. 2007); State v. Evins, 645 S.E.2d 904, 913 (S.C. 2007);
State v. Bryant, 642 S.E.2d 582, 589 (S.C. 2007); State v. Bennett, 632 S.E.2d
281, 289 (S.C. 2006); see e.g., State v. Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556, 567 (S.C. 2009)
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court routinely supports this single sentence analysis with a
string cite of approximately three cases, on average, in which
death sentences were upheld and the cases involved the same
aggravating circumstance as the case under review. The court
makes no effort to compare the circumstances of the defendants'
lives and backgrounds in even the limited pool of cases that it
does consider. The court's inquiry is constitutionally and
statutorily deficient because it fails to meaningfully consider
similarly situated defendants convicted of similar crimes.
VI. CASE EXAMPLE: A MEANINGFUL PROPORTIONALITY
ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THERE IS NO
RATIONAL BASIS FOR DISTINGUISHING DEATH CASES
FROM NON-DEATH CASES IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A meaningful proportionality analysis in an actual case
illustrates this point. For this example, we use the facts of an
actual homicide case from Lexington County. Kevin Mercer, an
African-American male, was convicted of murder and armed
robbery in connection with a carjacking at the Raintree
Apartment complex near Columbia, South Carolina.210 The State
alleged, and the jury found, armed robbery as the single
aggravating circumstance.211 An eyewitness viewed the
carjacking taking place from an apartment bedroom window and
called 911.212 Mercer was arrested shortly thereafter driving the
victim's car with his co-defendant, Marcus Thompson, seated in
the passenger seat.213 The murder weapon was found under the
driver's side seat of the victim's vehicle. The ammunition for this
weapon and two pairs of gloves were found in Thompson's
("We further find that the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance, and that the sentence of death is proportionate to
sentences imposed under similar situations."); State v. Owens, 664 S.E.2d 80,
82 (S.C. 2008) ("[A] review of other decisions demonstrates that appellant's
sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate.").
210. State v. Mercer, 672 S.E.2d 556, 558 (S.C. 2009).
211. Id. at 557.
212. Id. at 558.
213. Id.
528
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possession.214 Mercer's size and clothing generally matched the
description of the eyewitness, although the witness only saw the
perpetrator from behind.215 At trial, the State offered evidence
that testing conducted on Mercer's left hand showed substances
consistent with gunshot residue, although it could not be
conclusively identified as gunshot residue.216 The eyewitness
description and inconclusive gunshot residue testing constituted
the bulk of the State's case against Mercer. Mercer was
convicted by an all-white jury in Lexington County and
sentenced to death.217 Under the South Carolina Supreme
Court's current "rubber stamp" method of proportionality review,
looking only at other cases in which the death penalty was
imposed and upheld, the court's proportionality analysis was as
follows:
We have conducted the statutorily mandated review under S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (2003). We find the sentence of death was
not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any
other arbitrary factor. We further find that the evidence
supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance, and that the sentence of death is proportionate
to sentences imposed under similar situations. Mercer's
convictions and sentence of death are affirmed. 218
214. Id. at 559.
215. Id. at 558-59.
216. Id. at 558.
217. Mercer's case highlights yet another arbitrary factor in capital
sentencing in South Carolina-geographic disparity in death sentences. There
is wide variation from county to county in whether the death penalty will be
sought or obtained. Blume, supra note 15, at 298. Mercer's crime occurred just
a few miles over the line between Richland and Lexington Counties. Lexington
county is part of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, from which a disproportionately
large share of death sentences have historically been produced. Id. at 299.
Richland county, however, has traditionally produced very few death sentences,
despite its relatively high murder rate. Id. Thus, based on the historical
trends, had Kevin Mercer's crime occurred just a few short miles over into
Richland county, it is likely that the State would never even have sought death
against him, or if it had, that a jury would not have imposed it.
218. Id. at 567 (citing State v. Huggins, 519 S.E.2d 574 (1999); State v.
McWee, 472 S.E.2d 235 (1996)).
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If the court were to look outside this narrow universe of
death cases, however, it would find numerous cases involving
offenses very similar to Mr. Mercer's in which the jury or judge
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death.
Moreover, if the court were to expand its inquiry further, it would
discover many similar cases in which the State did not even seek
death. Both of these categories are relevant to the question of
whether a death sentence in Kevin Mercer's case is proportionate
to the offense. Such an approach would be consistent with the
methods of several other states, which have embraced a more
robust method of proportionality review. For example, Delaware,
Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia
all consider cases that went to a penalty trial regardless of
whether the defendants received life or death sentences.219
Louisiana, Washington, and New Jersey (prior to abolishing the
death penalty in December 2007) also consider murder cases in
which the death penalty was not sought.220
A. Death Cases Resulting in Life or Less
Collecting and analyzing the data necessary to conduct a
thorough, meaningful proportionality review in South Carolina is
not a difficult task. Indeed, the same small team of researchers
that collected the data described in Part III were able to compile
the necessary information in only a few days. The research team
219. See, e.g., Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 139 (Del. 1980) (explaining
that including life cases is "inherently fair, logical and necessary to prevent
disproportionate sentencing"); State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 537 (N.M. 2005)
(including as comparison cases "those New Mexico cases in which a defendant
was convicted under the same aggravating circumstance(s) and then received
either the death penalty or life imprisonment"); State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783,
800 (S.D. 2006) ("[A]nalysis of similar cases ...compares cases involving a
capital sentencing proceeding, whether life imprisonment or a death sentence
was imposed"); Gray v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 448, 457 (Va. 2007)
(comparing "other capital murder cases, including those cases when a life
sentence was imposed"); see also State v. Sattler, 956 P.2d 54, 72 (Mont. 1998);
State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 679 (Tenn. 2006).
220. See State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810, 875-76 (La. 2008); State v.
Feaster, 757 A.2d 266, 272-74 (N.J. 2000); State v. Yates, 168 P.3d 359, 398-99
(Wash. 2007).
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created a comprehensive database of cases between the years
1995 and 2007 in which the state sought the death penalty and
the outcome of the case was a sentence of life or less. When a
South Carolina solicitor serves notice that he or she intends to
seek the death penalty in a particular case, the South Carolina
Supreme Court issues an order appointing a particular circuit
judge to have exclusive jurisdiction over that case. Since late
1994, these appointment orders have been kept by the Office of
Court Administration. Thus, the research team began by
reviewing the files at the Office of Court Administration and
compiling a list of all death-noticed cases in South Carolina from
1995 to 2007.221 Next, the researchers sorted the cases by county
and traveled in teams to select county courthouses, where they
reviewed the individual case files and collected data about the
facts and circumstances of the crime, the characteristics and
background of the defendant and the victim, and the ultimate
outcome of the case. The research produced the following data:
9 From 1995 to 2007, South Carolina solicitors sought death
in 226 cases-an average of 17.4 per year.
e The greatest concentration of death-noticed cases came
from the following counties: Calhoun, Charleston, Clarendon,
Dillon, Florence, Greenville, Greenwood, Horry, Lexington,
Richland, Spartanburg, and Sumter. In these counties alone,
the state sought death in 124 cases during the relevant years.
The research team collected comprehensive data on each
death-noticed case in these counties. Of the 124 cases from the
selected counties, 115 resulted in a sentence of life or less. Thus,
nearly 93% of the total cases in which the state sought death in
these counties resulted in a sentence of life or less. Of those 115
cases:
221. Because the Office of Court Administration did not begin collecting the
appointment orders until late in 1994, the data for that year was excluded from
the analysis.
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* 50 resulted in a sentence less than death as a result of a
plea agreement;
* 39 were jury verdicts of life or less;
* 9 were sentences of life or less handed down by a judge;
• In 3 cases, the State opted to withdraw the death notice,
without a plea agreement, before trial;
; In 1 case, a judge found that the defendant was not eligible
for the death penalty because he was mentally retarded;
* In 6 cases, the state did obtain the death penalty, but it
was subsequently vacated because the defendant was under
the age of 18 at the time of the crime; and
* 7 resulted in a sentence less than death for a reason that
could not be determined by a review of the case files.
A closer look at the facts of these cases shows no meaningful
difference from the facts of Mr. Mercer's case. Mr. Mercer was
charged with murder and armed robbery. Of the 115 cases that
resulted in life or less, 68 (or 59%) involved an armed robbery
aggravator and 49 (or 43%) involved purpose of receiving money
or a thing of monetary value as an aggravating circumstance.
Kevin Mercer's case is, in many respects, an unaggravated
homicide compared to the majority of cases in this data set. For
example, 100 (or 87%) of the 115 cases that resulted in a life
sentence or less involved more than one aggravating
circumstance. Seventeen of the cases involved six or more
aggravating circumstances in a single case. Sixteen of the
defendants in this group killed more than one person. Two
dismembered their victims.
The State's evidence against Mr. Mercer was not any
stronger in his particular case than in the 115 cases resulting in
a sentence of life or less. As discussed above, the State's case for
guilt against Mr. Mercer involved eyewitness identification and
inconclusive gunshot residue testing. Twenty-eight (28) of the
115 cases in the sample also involved eyewitness testimony. In
fact, many of the cases in the sample involved an even stronger
case for guilt and/or death than was present in Mr. Mercer's
case:
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9 In 37 cases the defendant gave a full confession directly to
the police;
* In 7 cases the defendant confessed to another witness who
was not involved in the crime;
* 9 cases had DNA evidence tying the defendant to the
crime; and
* 1 case included a videotape of the crime.
B. Death-Eligible cases in Which the State Did Not Seek
Death
As explained in Part III, researchers collected data on all
homicides in Richland County for the years 2000 to 2008. During
this period of time, there were 152 homicide profiles collected.
One-hundred and seventeen (117)-or 77%-of these cases
involved facts that made them death-eligible, yet Richland
County solicitors sought the death penalty in only 4 of these
cases. With regard to the remaining 113 cases in which the State
could have, but elected not to seek the death penalty, a
comparison with the facts of Mr. Mercer's case again reveals no
meaningful difference that would render him more deserving of
death:
* 38 of the 113 cases involved armed robber;
* 4 involved physical torture;
* 85 involved facts that would support more than one
aggravating circumstance;
* 57 cases involved three or more aggravating
circumstances.222
222. By contrast, Max Knoten was one of the four defendants in this data
set against whom the state did seek the death penalty. State v. Knoten, 555
S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 2001). Knoten was convicted of murdering a thirty-year-old
woman by beating her to death with a pipe and then drowning a three-year-old
girl. Id. at 393. The jury found four aggravating circumstances: rape, torture,
muder of more than one person, and murder of a child under the age of eleven.
Nonetheless, that jury voted to impose a life sentence for Knoten. Id.
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A comparison to the data collected in Charleston County
produces similar results. There were 151 homicide profiles
collected in Charleston County for the years 2002 to 2007. One-
hundred and fourteen (114)-or 76%--of these cases were death-
eligible. Charleston County solicitors sought death in four (4) of
those cases. In the remaining 110 cases in which the State could
have, but elected not to seek the death penalty:
* 31 of the 110 cases involved kidnapping;
* 36 involved robbery;
* 10 involved larceny with the use of a deadly weapon;
* 28 involved physical torture;
* 36 were committed for the purpose of receiving money or a
thing of monetary value;
* 3 involved the killing of a law enforcement officer;
* 10 of these cases involved facts supporting five or more
aggravating circumstances.
Thus, there is no meaningful basis of distinction-either by
comparing Mr. Mercer's case to others in which the State sought
but failed to obtain a death sentence, or by comparing his case to
others in which the State could have but opted not to seek a
death sentence-that would prove Mr. Mercer was somehow the
worst of the worst and therefore more deserving of death than
any other defendant charged with murder. Instead, he is simply
one of the capriciously selected few who has had the unfortunate
luck of being struck by lightning.
VII. CONCLUSION
Through repeated additions to the statutory list of
aggravating factors and further expansion. of the aggravating
factors through judicial interpretation, South Carolina's capital
sentencing statute does not genuinely narrow the class of
individuals eligible for a sentence of death as mandated by the
Eighth Amendment. The empirical evidence demonstrates that
the overwhelming majority of homicides in South Carolina are
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legally death-eligible. Thus, to the extent that any narrowing
occurs in South Carolina's capital sentencing scheme, it is
performed by and at the unbridled discretion of solicitors and
judge or jury sentencers, where whim, passion, political pressure,
prejudice and caprice have ample and unconstitutional room to
roam. To compound the problem, South Carolina has no effective
method for monitoring and regulating the capital sentencing
scheme because the South Carolina Supreme Court fails to
conduct meaningful proportionality review. Thus, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has failed to fulfill its constitutional
duty to remedy unconstitutional practices occurring at the trial
level. These characteristics render South Carolina's methods for
the imposition and review of capital punishment more akin to the
statute rejected as unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in Furman than the one approved of in Gregg.223
As such, South Carolina's statutory scheme has not withstood the
test of time and experience, and it should be struck down because
it is unconstitutional.
223. Although a detailed discussion of alternative proposals is outside the
scope of this Article, there are at least three steps that we would recommend to
bring South Carolina's capital sentencing scheme back in line with the
requirements of Furman and Gregg, short of abolishing the death penalty
altogether. First, the legislature could scale back the pool of death-eligible
offenders by carefully crafting a much narrower and more specific set of
aggravating circumstances. Second, South Carolina could adopt a racial justice
act that would prevent the State from seeking or carrying out a death sentence
in cases where the defendant can show racial bias through the use of historical
and statistical evidence. Kentucky and North Carolina have enacted such
statutes. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.200 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15A-2010-15A-2012 (West 2009). For a detailed discussion on the merits of a
racial justice act, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in
Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for a Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 519 (1995). A racial justice act could also require more
transparency in prosecutorial decision making by imposing reporting
requirements. Several states have imposed reporting requirements in an effort
to combat racial profiling in the context of traffic stops. See, e.g., David A.
Harris, The Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of
Data Collection, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73 (Summer 2003). Third, the
South Carolina Supreme Court should conduct a meaningful proportionality
review in capital cases, which we have demonstrated is not a difficult task.
535
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